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Abstract
We explore the empirical interaction between firm growth, financing constraints and job creation. Using a novel
small business survey from Uganda, we find that the extent to which small businesses expand skilled employ-
ment as their sales and profits increase depends significantly on access to external funding, while the hiring of
casual and family workers does not. The results are robust to the inclusion of various firm level controls, region
and sector fixed effects. We address reverse causality concerns by providing empirical evidence using planned
hiring regression specifications. Our results are an indication for the importance of access to finance for skilled
job creation in developing countries.
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1 Introduction
Creating stable employment opportunities is a primary concern for policymakers in many developing economies.
Most developing countries in Africa have grown rapidly over the past decade, even as the Global Recession has
gripped many European countries and the United States. Since most of its countries have become independent
around 1960, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced the best decade of growth between 2000-2012, where GDP
grew more than 4.5% annually on average. However, this growth has not translated into similarly high growth
rates in job creation. In many countries in Africa, the source of growth has primarily relied upon oil, gas and
mineral extraction. Even though the number of industrial sector jobs is projected to increase 55 percent over
the next 10 years, the growth comes from a small base and will not come close to absorbing the millions of
new workers entering the labor force each year (Brooks et al., 2014). What is even more challenging is that
many educated workers also fail to be absorbed into the labor market. The lack of employment opportunities
for highly skilled and trained workers raises the question of whether there is a shortage of firm-level demand for
skill in African economies or there are other constraints holding back their inclusion in the labor market.
The vast literature on finance and growth has shown the importance of access to external funding for firm-
level investment decisions, economic development and growth (see Levine, 2005, for an overview). Access to
credit remains difficult for firms in Sub-Saharan Africa and continues to top the policy agendas concerning
African economic development. In this context, while several papers have documented the relationship between
financing constraints and capital investment and growth, there are relatively few papers gauging the importance
of financing constraints for hiring decisions, especially of skilled workers. The aim of this paper is to investigate
the role of financial constraints in firms’ skilled labor demand in developing countries. Specifically, using a small
business survey from Uganda, we test whether the likelihood of skilled job creation at profitable businesses rises
with access to external finance.
Economic theory predicts a critical role of financing constraints in hiring decisions, similar to the role that
they have for capital investment (Benmelech et al., 2011). First, timing differences between when wages are
paid and when revenues are received might require the need for working capital, and the lack of it can constrain
labor demand. This results in a stronger financing constraint in the case of hiring skilled workers, because
skilled employees often get paid a skill-premium and hence receive higher wages and the expected contribution
of skilled workers for future revenues might be relatively more intangible than that of unskilled labor - raising
firm-level uncertainty. Second, if hiring of permanent staff implies fixed costs (including training or firing costs),
this might require additional funding, again an effect which is expected to be stronger for skilled and experienced
workers (Oi, 1962). Third, job creation might be restricted by financing constraints if capital and labor are
complementary factors in the production process. Finally, the decision whether to hire permanent or fixed-term
employees (Caggese and Cun˜at, 2008) is likely to be more pronounced for hiring of skilled and experienced work-
ers, where wages are higher and outside options are more for the workers. We expect all of these channels to be
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stronger at profitable firms on growth paths, where demand for skilled and experienced workers should be higher.
We empirically explore the interactions between financing constraints, firm growth - measured in sales (as
well as in profits) - and job creation. Using a comprehensive small business survey data collected in 2013 from
a nationwide representative sample of 1,839 Ugandan companies, we test the extent to which access to external
bank funding conditions the relationship between firm growth and employment creation. While this relationship
is clearly an endogenous one, several features of our data and the estimation methodology allow us to isolate the
effect of firms’ financing constraints on firms’ hiring decisions. First, following Popov and Udell (2012), Brown,
Ongena, Popov and Yein (2011), Cox and Jappelli (1993), and Duca and Rosenthal (1993), we isolate demand
from supply-side financial constraints by distinguishing between firms that (i) applied for and received a loan,
(ii) were rejected or discouraged from applying for a loan, and (iii) state that they did not need a loan. Second,
our survey also allows us to distinguish between different types of employee categories at a given establishment
such as trained and experienced, as well as permanent, casual and family/friends. While theory predicts a
constraining effect of lack of access to finance on the hiring of skilled and trained workers, it does not do so for
casual workers or family workers and we can exploit this difference in our hypothesis testing. Third, we can
differentiate between growing and non-growing firms, which will determine the demand for labor. Finally, in
robustness tests we relate today’s financing constraints to future hiring plans, thus controlling effectively for
reverse causation.
While we use data for one specific Sub-Saharan African country, Uganda resembles in its economic and
demographic structure many other developing economies. Uganda is a landlocked low-income country in Africa,
which has experienced high GDP growth over the recent years, reaching 4.8% in 2013 and even higher rates
were projected for 2014. However, the vast majority of Uganda’s labor force remains employed in relatively low
productivity sectors, such as agriculture (World Bank, 2013). Ugandans with higher education are more likely
to be unemployed and to under-utilize their skill sets; many educated workers are employed in a job ill-suited
to their skills or emigrate to find appropriate employment (EDPRD Uganda, 2014). Uganda has the world’s
youngest population with over 78% of its population below the age of 30; as the population continues to grow
at a rate of 3.2% annually, the country has one of the highest youth unemployment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa
(The State of Uganda Population Report, 2013). Many of the new entrants are highly educated as a result of
past policies to encourage school enrolment and completing further education. There is thus a strong pool of
talent to be utilized and the binding constraints for job creation remain on the firm side (EDPRD Uganda,
2014). The challenge for Ugandan policy makers is therefore to oversee the labor force’s effective transition
from a predominantly low productivity and agriculture based economy to a high-human capital intensive -
manufacturing and service sector based - economy.
Our empirical analysis shows that growing and profitable small businesses create more jobs for trained and
experienced workers - which we interpret as demand for skill - if they have access to external finance. Specif-
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ically, growing and profitable firms only hire experienced and trained employees if they are not rejected or
discouraged from applying for external finance. In our regression analysis we do not find such a significant
relationship in the case of hiring casual employees or family and friends, suggesting that - in line with theory -
financing constraints are more likely to bind in the context of employment contracts associated with experienced
and trained employees with high human capital intensity. These results are robust to a large set of firm level
controls as well as region and sector fixed effects. Our results suggest that financially constrained firms save
their excess resources instead of investing in more sophisticated and skilled labor-force. These results are in
line with prior and well established conclusions emphasized by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who document that
firms on growth path are more likely to invest in physical capital when provided with access to finance and
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) who show that constrained firms have a positive cash flow sensitivity of
investment. Our findings are robust to alternative classifications of financial access. Our results also hold when
we regress firms’ future hiring intentions (i.e. planned hiring) on firm performance and financial access - after
controlling for recent hiring trends at the firm. The results from this latter regression support the argument
that our benchmark results are not likely to be driven by a reverse causation bias.
The findings from our research have important policy implications as they underline the importance of well
developed financial systems for job creation. As policy makers grapple with the challenge of creating formal and
permanent jobs in a still growing society, financial sector policies can be critical. The inability for constrained
firms to hire quality labor even though they are performing well is an issue for economic development and
highlights the misallocation of high capital labor. Our results also show that beyond helping firms grow faster,
more efficient financial systems can also have an impact on poverty alleviation by helping urgently needed jobs.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, we add to the literature on financing constraints
in developing economies. These include a series of papers that investigate the effects of firm financing con-
straints on firm growth (Ayyagari et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2005; Beck et al., 2008) as well as firm sales and
performance (Banerjee and Duflo, 2014; Zia, 2008; De Mel et al., 2008). Second, we add to a smaller and more
recent literature on the relationship between financing constraints and job creation. On the aggregate level,
Pagano and Pica (2012) show a positive and significant relationship between financial development and job
creation in developing countries. Gine´ and Townsend (2004) show for Thailand that financial liberalization has
contributed to migration of subsistence agricultural workers into urban salaried jobs. For the U.S., Beck, Levine
and Levkov (2010) and Benmelech, Bergman and Seru (2011) show that branch deregulation and consequent
financial liberalization led to decreases in unemployment and increased labor market participation especially
among low-skilled workers. Chodorow-Reich (2014) shows that firms with a pre-crisis relationships with less
healthy lenders had higher reductions in employment following the Lehman bankruptcy compared to pre-crisis
clients of healthier lenders. On a similar note, Cingano et al. (2016) show that bank exposure to the credit shock
predicts firm investment rates, resulting in lower levels of firm employment. Campello, Graham and Harvey
(2010) survey 1,050 CFOs in the U.S, Europe and Asia and find that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in
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tech spending, capital and most relevantly, employment. On a similar note, Brown and Matsa (2016) show that
firm financial distress results in fewer and lower quality job applicants.
Several papers gauge the differential effect of financing constraints on employment. Benito and Hernando
(2007) show for a sample of Spanish firms from 1985-2000 that higher cash flow is associated with relatively
more temporary employment while higher levels of financial pressure is associated with relatively lower levels
of temporary employment. Caggese and Cun˜at (2008) show for a sample of Italian firms that financing con-
straints bias enterprises towards fixed-term rather than permanent contracts. Popov (2015) investigates the
determinants of firm-on-the-job training and finds that credit constrained firms have a 38% lower probability
of investing in on-the-job training. Our paper contributes to this literature by gauging the role of financing
constraints in the relationship between firm growth and skilled job creation in a low-income country
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the composition of our data
and section 3 on the benchmark econometric model. Section 4 presents the main empirical findings. Section 5
presents a series of robustness checks and tackles the endogeneity concerns with respect to financial access and
firm performance. Lastly, section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Our data come from a small business survey conducted in 2013 in Uganda. Together with Financial Sector
Deepening Trust Uganda (FSD-U), we designed the survey instrument that allowed us to collect this business
survey data. The project was funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) and Financial
Sector Deepening Trust Uganda (FSD-U). The survey was administered by an independent consulting company
and in total data from 1839 small and medium sized businesses were collected. The majority of the survey
respondents were either owners of the firm or higher level managers that had adequate access to firm financial
and operational information.1 The survey data provide information on firm financials, operations and most
importantly, detailed answers on employment characteristics. For the purpose of this study, we exclude all
financial firms from our analysis. After this refinement, we are left with 1702 firms. They come from all
five regions of Uganda, 79 districts as well as 16 sectors. The businesses are sampled from sectors such as
manufacturing, construction, agricultural, forestry, and utilities. Firms were randomly selected to take part
in the survey and compliance was optional. Table 1 describes the composition of our data-set with respect to
location, region and sector classifications. In unreported tabulations, we find very little sectoral level differences
when it comes to financial constraints and employment categories and we do not observe any pattern for
dominant financial constraint status or employment behavior specific to a particular industry.
[Insert here Table 1]
1To be exact, 1,256 of the respondents were owners and over 450 were identified as managers.
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2.1 Labor and Employment Variables
The main focus of this study is to understand the determinants of firms’ employment composition and especially
the demand for skilled labor. To serve this purpose, our survey categorizes five different types of employment.
Specifically, the categories that we identify are (i) Trained, (ii) Experienced, (iii) Permanent, (iv) Casual and
(v) Family/Friends. Trained employees are those who have a formal training appropriate for their particular
occupation, while Experienced employees are those who have work experience for at least two consecutive years
in a particular occupation; we refer to these two categories as skilled employees. Permanent employees are
those who have worked at the interviewed firm on a daily basis for at least 3 consecutive months, while Casual
employees are part time workers and Family employees are either family, relatives or friends. Skilled employees
are expected to be more costly for the firm. In order to draw a clear picture to this end, the survey asks
respondents to provide the average monthly salary that they pay to each category of employees. The survey
responses show that the average salary for skilled employee is almost double than that of other employees;
225,700 Ugandan Shilling for trained and experienced compared to 135,400 Ugandan shillings for casual and
family employees. When comparing within the same firm, we find an even starker difference, with the average
wages for trained and experienced workers being 312% higher than for casual and family workers. Therefore,
we conjecture that the hiring rates and the demand for skilled workers is adversely affected by firms’ limited
financial access compared to the overall demand for employees.
The survey also asks the respondents if the labor demand for the categories (i)-(v) above increased, decreased
or stayed the same over the last 12 months. This means we have the information whether the firm hired or
fired employees the past one year and if so, how many. This allows us to investigate the dynamics governing the
composition of employment both along extensive and intensive margins. We would like to highlight that the
employee categories (i)-(v) are not fully distinct from one another and there are clear overlaps among certain
variables. For example, there might be certain cases where a firm employee is a permanent employee as well as
a family member.
We present summary statistics of the key variables in Table 2. We observe that only 25% of our firms hired
over the previous 12 months. Specifically, we observe 149 firms that hire permanent employees, 65 that hire
casual employees, 35 that hire family employees, 86 that hire trained employees and 87 that hire experienced
employees.
2.2 Firm Performance, Financing Constraints and Control Variables
In our regression analysis, firm performance is proxied by either sales or profits. The survey asks each firm
its sales and profits from the previous month, where profits refer to the total income after paying all expenses
including wages for employees, taxes, rents, interest expenditures etc., but not including any income paid to the
owner. In addition, the survey asks whether sales and profits had increased or decreased when compared to the
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same month of the last year. With this recall information, we are tracking the dynamics in firm performance
over time. Specifically, variables DSales and DProfits take the value of 1 if the performance variable increased,
0 if there was no change and -1 if there was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the
firm a year ago.2
In order to measure the degree of firms’ financing constraints, we utilize information on whether a firm has
outstanding loans and whether the firm has applied for a loan as well as the reasons for not having applied
for a loan. This information allows us to identify firms who were rejected or discouraged from applying for
loans. It also allows us to distinguish between firms that have not applied for a loan because they were dis-
couraged and firms that have not applied because they have no demand. There are many firms in our sample
who never applied for a loan, however, would need a commercial loan for their operations. In line with earlier
and established research, we split the sample based on categories of financial access as (i) Applied and Got a
Loan (ii) Cannot Get a Loan and (iii) Do not Need a Loan. Group (i) consists of firms who applied for a loan
and got accepted to receive one.3 Group (ii) include firms that applied for a loan, but got rejected as well as
firms that did not apply for a loan, but state in the survey that they need a loan for their operations. Group
(iii) includes all the firms who have not applied for a loan, because they do not need a loan for their business.
Including this third group allows us to disentangle between demand and supply-side constraints. The data in
Table 2 show that 62.5% of firms were either rejected or discouraged from applying, while 10.5% received a loan.
We include a set of additional control variables in our econometric analysis. As a standard control vari-
able to proxy size, we include the log of invested capital. InvestedCapital measures the investments made
by the firm over the past 12 months. These purchases include machinery, equipment (including computers
and software), buildings, land, training/human capital for the employees and other investment.4 We include
BusinessAge to measure firm experience. As firms with higher R&D expenses require more formal and high
skilled employees, we add a dummy variable to our benchmark regression equation, which will be equal to one
if the firm introduced any innovative product, service or process over the past two years. Lastly, we include
the education of the owner as a control variable. It might be that owners who have a higher education truly
understand the benefits derived from skilled employment. Because of this, they might have a large influence on
the employment composition of the firm. Therefore, we include three dummy variables. The owner is regarded
as having a LowEducation if he has at most primary school education. We classify MediumEducation if the
owner has a secondary degree education and HighEducation if they have a tertiary, university (undergraduate),
2While the survey also asked respondents to quantify the realized profits and sales, very few of them were able to provide this
information. Survey questions in developing countries are typically phrased in such a manner so that it is most conceivable for
the respondents. For example, in many cases firms are only able report their monthly revenues. This is mainly because they do
not have any systematic book keeping or reliable estimates for annual performance. Therefore, our questions are also phrased in
monthly terms.
3For consistency, we drop 11 observations from the sample where firms admitted to having a loan, but have never applied for a
loan.
4Other investments firms made included purchases of furniture, agriculture related investments such as livestock, rental expendi-
tures, nets, watering pipes, boats and all other kinds of miscellaneous items. While we have information on the total CapitalStock
of firms, only a small proportion of the firms in the sample disclosed this information.
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postgraduate (Masters, Doctors or PhD) degree education. We maintain the education groups Other as the
base category in our analysis. The Appendix provides more information on the additional control variables
included in our analysis.
[Insert here Table 2]
Panel C in Table 2 presents two-sample t-tests for equal means. The population of firms is split between
firms who Applied and Got a Loan and firms who Cannot Get a Loan. The results show that the firms are
qualitatively similar when it comes to performance, invested capital, age and education. However, firms who
are not financially constrained were significantly more likely to introduce a new innovative product, service or
process. Results remain similar when we compare firms who Applied and Got a Loan against all others. In
addition, since we observe low amounts of overall hiring in our sample, one might be concerned that our findings
hinge on a very small subset of firms that would therefore drive our results. Two sample t-tests among firms
who hire skilled employees remain the same. Unconstrained firms who hire skilled employees and constrained
firms who hire skilled employees are qualitatively similar when it comes to performance, invested capital, age
and education. We do not report these results for brevity.
Table 3 presents the correlations between key variables to be included in the regression analysis. The
measures of firm-performance, “changes in profits” and “changes in sales” relative to the year before (DProfit
and DSales), are positively correlated with hiring trained, experienced and permanent employees, but not with
hiring casual and family employees. As expected, higher firm size and financial access is correlated with all five
categories of employee types.
[Insert here Table 3]
3 Model and Methodology
To explore the effects of performance and financial access on dynamics of employment composition, we will
estimate the following empirical specification:
ChangeinEmployeeik = α0 + β1PerformanceGroupi ∗AppliedandGotLoani
+ β2PerformanceGroupi ∗ CannotGetaLoani + λXi + i. (1)
The dependent variable, ChangeinEmployee, is based on the five different categories of employment that we
consider; namely, trained, experienced, permanent, casual and family. The firm is indexed by i and the type
of employment is denoted via the subscript k. We vary these variables by examining the hiring decisions at
employee type k. We will use both extensive and intensive margins of hiring decisions. First, we will use a
dummy variable equalling to 1 if the firm had hired (variable DHire) an employee from a particular category of
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k in the past 12 months, thus the extensive margin demand for employment. In a second step, we will use the
actual number of employees hired, which measures the intensive hiring margin.
On the right hand side of our regressions, we proxy the performance of the firm based on two measures:
Changes in Sales and Changes in Profits. PerformanceGroup variables are categorical variables that indicate
whether sales or profits increased or decreased, as already discussed above. Specifically, variables DSales and
DProfits take the value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there was
a decrease in sales or profits relative to the performance of the firm a year ago.
The baseline regressions are estimated via standard OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) for the extensive margin
and via Tobit model for the intensive margin. We use Tobit for our intensive margin regression analysis in order
to account for left censoring in the dependent variable. We use OLS instead of probit or logit models for the
extensive margin regressions, as we would otherwise lose sectoral and locational cells where either all or (more
likely) no firm hires employees of a specific type. We use Tobit estimations for the regressions with actual hiring
as the dependent variable, given their left-censored nature, as we need to account for both the probability of
being above the limit (in this case zero), as well as the continuous values of hiring above zero.
The main interest of all our regressions will be to evaluate the significance of the interaction terms be-
tween financial access and performance. To test formally whether access to finance interacts with measures
of performance in determining the changes in employment composition, we will conduct Wald tests as follows.
H0 = β1PerformanceGroupi ∗AppliedandGotLoani = β2PerformanceGroupi ∗ CannotGetaLoani = 0
4 Empirical Results
The results in Table 4 show that only growing firms with access to external funding translate this growth into
hiring of skilled employees. In our regressions, the main coefficients of interest are the interaction terms, which
we present at the top rows of each table. Firms who experience increases in performance (via profit or sales)
and at the same time also have a bank loan, hire more trained and experienced employees when compared
to their well-performing but constrained counterparts, who don’t have access to external finance. The Wald
tests of the differences of the coefficients show that this difference is significant. Also, both constrained and
unconstrained firms are more likely to hire skilled employees than firms who do not demand external funding.
The economic effects of our regressions are also significant and sizable. The first column in table 4 shows that
among firms with rising profits, firms with access to loans are 6.5 percentage points more likely to hire trained
and 7 percentage points more likely to hire experienced employees than financially constrained firms. Given
that the average likelihood of hiring trained or experienced workers is 5%, this is a large economic effect. We
find similar large effects among firms with rising sales as well as for firms whose financing needs are satisfied
and those that are financially constrained.
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Turning to the control variables in our regressions, we find that larger firms, measured by invested capital,
are more likely to hire trained and experienced employees. In addition, firms that introduced a new innovative
product, are also more likely to hire skilled labor. Our results do not find any evidence for the effects of firm
age or education of the business owner on the propensity to hire more skilled employees. What is interesting
to note is that performance alone does not affect the likelihood of hiring skilled employees. The performance
variables are both insignificant and their economic effects are minimal. Our results indicate that performance
mainly affects the likelihood of firm level skilled hiring via the interaction with financial access.
[Insert here Table 4]
The results in Table 5 show that financing constraints matter not only for the extensive but also intensive
margin. We now incorporate the realized values for hiring skilled employees. Specifically, we run the same
regression structure as in Table 4, except we use realized hiring numbers and we estimate the model via
the Tobit censored regression model. The results in Table 5 are consistent with our previous findings on the
extensive margin. For experienced employees, our variables of interest remain significant and the null hypothesis
(interactions are equal to one another) is rejected under both specifications. The results for trained employees
are less significant, however, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients are in line with our earlier results.
In terms of economic effect, firms with a positive performance and access to external funding employ between
0.3-3.5 more skilled employees than firms with positive performance and financing constraints.
[Insert here Table 5]
The results in Table 6 show that access to external funding is not relevant for hiring decisions of less skilled
workers, including casual and family workers. Here, we test whether financing constraints could also be relevant
for hiring decisions of permanent or casual employees or family members. While theory does not make a clear
prediction on the hiring of permanent employees, as they could be either skilled or not-skilled, theory does not
predict any impact of access to external funding for the hiring decisions of casual workers or family members.
Nearly all our coefficients of interest in Table 6 are insignificant, suggesting that growing firms with greater
levels of financial access do not employ more casual employees or family members These results remain the same
for various econometric specifications. We note that in some cases financially constrained firms are more likely
to hire other forms of labor. This might imply a substitution effect on employment. These results are intuitive,
but we cannot establish this relationship for all our econometric specifications.
To further test any potential substitution effects, we exploit a question that asks the respondents whether
they had made any “training or human capital investments” for their employees in the past year. With this
information, we run the same regressions as before, but replace the dependent variable with a dummy variable
DEmployee Training. We present the results in columns 7 and 8. Our results are similar to earlier findings.
Firms with higher performance and greater financial access are more likely to train their employees or invest
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in human capital. These results are in line with findings by Popov (2015) and demonstrate that the firms in
our sample do not substitute the lack of skilled employment with employee training or similar forms of human
capital investment. The results from all these empirical tests indicate that alleviating financial constraints has a
clear effect on relatively high-skill labor as opposed to the lower skilled and informal employment. As mentioned
earlier, casual and family employees are often less costly and they often add proportionally less to firm value
than high-skill employees. Our analysis shows that informal employment demand is often met on a firm level
and therefore changes in performance and financial access have negligible effects on their composition.
[Insert here Table 6]
In summary, growing firms with demand for external finance only hire skilled and trained employees if their
financing needs are satisfied, while there appears to be no such constraints for the hiring of casual workers and
family members. This result is in line with Kaplan and Zingales (1997) analysis on “the positive association
between cash-flow sensitivity of investment and financial access” - providing indicative evidence that in devel-
oping countries human capital investment’s cash-flow sensitivity behaves in a way similar to physical capital
investment’s cash-flow sensitivity.
5 Robustness Tests
In this section, we present a series of robustness checks for our main findings. First, we address reverse causality
concerns in the relationship between financial access and firm performance. In addition, we conduct a robustness
test where we alter our financial access sub-groups. Finally, we use alternative econometric specifications to
test the sensitivity of our results to the model specification.
5.1 Addressing Reverse Causality
Reverse causality is a concern for our model, as it is likely that changes in employment quality could have
an effect on firms’ probability of financing as well as firm performance. It may be the case that changes in
employee composition drive access to finance. The higher the quantity of skilled employees, the larger the firm,
the greater legitimacy in the loan application process. Because of this reverse causality concern, our model
might be improperly identified. To address this possible bias, we analyze the effects of firm performance and
financial access on Planned Hiring. For this, we utilize a survey question on how many trained, experienced,
permanent and casual employees firms plan to hire over the upcoming 12 months. We run the same regressions
as before, except that our dependent variable is now PlannedHiring. Unlike contemporaneous hiring, which
might affect access to external funding (by, e.g., sending positive signals to lender), it is less likely that future
hiring plans influence today’s access to external finance.5
5We acknowledge that we cannot fully eliminate this concern. It could be argued that because firms were planning to steadily
increase employment over the next few years, this is the reason they applied for the loan in the first place. This might happen in
order to cover for the gradual increases in costs.
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We run the same models as before with planned hiring of firms as a dependent variable. The DPlanned
Hiring variable measures the hiring intentions of the firm. The variable takes the value of one if the firm intends
to hire one or more employees in the future. In the survey approximately 300 firms gave actual values to these
questions of which only around a 100 admitted to not planning to hire anyone in the future. All other 1500
observations were labeled as missing values. In order to have enough observations to conduct this analysis,
we convert all missing values to zero. We understand that this is a strong assumption; and therefore, we also
perform alternative conversions to assure that our findings are not solely a result of this conversion. Specifically,
we only consider missing values that were labeled as “do not know” as zero, thus only converting approximately
60 missing observations. This is a more conservative conversion as the answer “do not know” can reasonably be
interpreted as a zero value. With this specification, our results are very much in line with our prior findings.6
Table 7 shows a positive and significant relationship between the interaction of profit/sales growth and access
to external funding, on the one hand, and future hiring of trained or experienced employees, on the other hand.
Columns (1)-(4) report the result that converts all the missing values to zero and columns (5)-(8) with the more
conservative conversion. Overall, the results are very similar to our prior findings. Firms with greater financial
access and positive performance plan to hire more skilled employees. Our Wald tests are significant across all
specifications and the magnitude of all coefficients are very similar to those found in earlier regressions. Most
notably, our first interaction PerformanceIncrease ∗AppliedandGotaLoan remains strongly significant across
nearly all specifications. These results suggest that greater financial access encourage well-performing firms to
plan on hiring more high skilled employees. In economic terms, growing firms with access to external funding
are between 8 and 42 percentage points more likely to plan to hire skilled employees than growing firms with
financing constraints. These results suggest that greater financial access encourage firms to plan on hiring more
high skilled employees.
[Insert here Table 7]
Additionally, we also test whether our results hold with actual values for planned employment, thus the
intensive margin of planned hiring. Firms reported that they were planning to hire on average between 0-30
employees depending on the employee type. In this setting, we run the same Tobit regressions as before, with
actual values for planned hiring and converting only the “do not know” replies to zero. We present the Tobit
regression results in Table 8. Under this specification, the majority of our results remain consistent with the
previous findings. Firms who have positive performance and access to bank credit plan to employ between
1.3-4.5 more skilled employees than firms with positive performance but no access to bank credit.
[Insert here Table 8]
Finally, to control for the fact that firms might exhibit some persistence over time with respect to hiring
behaviour, we include actual current hiring in our planned hiring regressions. We conduct separate regressions
6For clarity, responses are not driven by the position of the responder in the firm. As we mentioned before, 1,248 out of the
total 1,839 respondents were owners of the firm and therefore “do not know” responses are not driven by the answers given by
managers or other employee statuses.
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where we include a dummy variable as well as the real hiring variable on whether the firm had previously hired
a particular skilled employee type. We present the results in Table 9. In columns 1-4, we present the regression
results for the extensive margin and columns 5-8 for the intensive margin while controlling for realized hiring
behavior. Our results remain consistent with our earlier findings, firms with higher financial access and positive
firm performance hire more skilled employees than constrained firms.
[Insert here Table 9]
5.2 Alternative Access to Finance Classification
In this section, we take a closer look into the division of our financial access sub-samples. Specifically, we distin-
guish among firms with financing constraints between those that were rejected and those that were discouraged,
though we expect the differences between these two groups to be small. The purpose of this exercise is to
separate these groups and to test whether there are further differences in employment composition. In addition,
we use this to test the consistency and robustness of our results while altering our financial access sub-samples.
The results in Table 10 show a significant role for external funding in hiring decisions of skilled employees.
All of our previous findings remain consistent across all specifications. Firms with greater financial access
(i.e. Applied for a Loan and Got a Loan) increase skilled employment relatively more than their constrained
counterparts as performance increases. The results from the Wald tests are in line with these results. We also
conduct Wald tests separately between each pair of interactions for all possible combinations. For example, in
the lower rows of table 10, “Test12 Chi” tests for the equality between the first and the second interaction and
“Test 23 Chi” between the second and the third interaction respectively. By doing so, we formally test for the
significant differences among all financial access sub-samples. The results from these alternative specifications
are also in line with the prior results. Based on the Wald tests, nearly all our interactions are significantly
distinct from one another. Coefficients are broadly significant and are in line with prior results claiming that
greater financial access and positive performance increase the hiring rates of skilled employment. We do not find
a consistent ranking in terms of whether rejected or discouraged are more likely to hire trained and experienced
workers if they grow.
[Insert here Table 10]
To further test the legitimacy of our discouraged group specification, we change our interpretation for the
discouraged firms. In earlier tests, respondents were asked whether firms needed “loan application and other
financial services in their business” and we used this information to determine whether a firm was discouraged.
In our survey, we also asked whether firms “would like to take out new debt in the next 12 months”. With this
question, we create a new variable Cannot Get a Loan2. This includes firms who (i) applied for a loan, but
got rejected and (ii) firms who did not apply for a loan but admit needing loan application and other financial
services as well as would like to take out new debt in the next 12 months. Overall, this is a more conservative
12
approach for classifying our constrained firms. The results in Table 11 show that our findings remain unchanged.
Greater financial access and positive performance increase hiring rates of skilled employment.
[Insert here Table 11]
5.3 Accounting for Total Skilled Employees
Our analysis is unable to fully account for firm size as clarified in earlier sections. In addition, due to the nature
of our study, firm size could potentially be better captured by accounting for total employment on the firm
level. In order to address these two key points, we include the total amount of skilled employees as a control
variable in our regressions. In the survey firms asked “how many of their their total employees were trained or
experienced”. By incorporating this information, we further control for firm size and average firm level skilled
employee requirements. The results in Table 12 show that our main findings remain unchanged. As one would
expect, we see that firms with more skilled employees hire more skilled employees. In addition and in line with
our earlier results, greater financial access and positive performance remain strong predictors for the hiring rates
of skilled employees.
[Insert here Table 12]
5.4 Other Robustness Tests
Estimating regressions where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable is more often better implemented
by using other limited dependent variable estimators such as Probit and Logit. When using OLS regressions
with dichotomous dependent variables, predicted probabilities are not necessarily bounded by values 0 and
1. OLS also assumes that there is a linear and additive relationship between the dependent and independent
variables and this is not always necessarily the case. Due to these inherent difficulties and more, we perform
alternative tests by incorporating a Probit model. We present the results from this estimation strategy in Table
13. Results from these tests are in line with our prior results.
[Insert here Table 13]
Finally, to further address potential concerns regarding omitted variables, we interact all the firm level
controls with the financial access variables. The results from these regressions are reported in Table 14. Our
main findings remain unchanged and we continue to show that firms with greater financial access and positive
performance have a higher probability of employing skilled labor, with significance levels and coefficient sizes
similar to our baseline results. These results thus show that the interaction of firm growth with access to
external funding does not proxy for the interaction of access to external finance with other firm characteristics.
[Insert here Table 14]
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6 Conclusion
We use a micro and small enterprise survey from Uganda and show that performance and higher financial access
is positively correlated with changes in high-skill employment. We find that firms with positive performance
and a bank loan hire more trained and experienced employees.This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms
with greater financial flexibility are more likely to hire skilled labor once their performance goes up. On the
other hand, firms who are financially constrained, must save a greater proportion of the additional profits (or
pay other expenses associated with financial constraints) and therefore cannot invest further in greater levels
of employment. We further investigate this relationship and show that performance and financial access do not
explain the hiring rates of informal employees, which include casual and family employees.
The results from our study underline the importance of financial sector development for employment. As
firms grow and become profitable, employment opportunities will increase for those who are formally trained,
educated and more experienced. With this, the labor force can become more permanent and potentially more
stable as well. This is an important issue for many nations and especially for developing countries. We have
shown that policymakers have yet another reason why they should tackle small firms’ financing constraints.
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Table 1: Sector and Region Composition
REGION
SECTOR NORTHERN EASTERN WESTERN CENTRAL KAMPALA Total
No. Col % No. Col % No. Col % No. Col % No. Col % No. Col %
ACCOMODATION 25 16.2 22 9.0 32 9.2 43 6.8 17 5.2 139 8.2
AGRICULTURE 3 1.9 46 18.9 50 14.4 178 28.3 22 6.7 299 17.6
CONSTRUCTION 4 2.6 6 2.5 12 3.5 7 1.1 9 2.7 38 2.2
EDUCATION & HEALTH 31 20.1 32 13.1 49 14.1 95 15.1 29 8.8 236 13.9
FOOD PROCESSING 18 11.7 39 16.0 27 7.8 43 6.8 21 6.4 148 8.7
INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION 10 6.5 16 6.6 42 12.1 21 3.3 26 7.9 115 6.8
MINING 1 0.6 5 2.0 5 1.4 17 2.7 7 2.1 35 2.1
OTHER MANUFACTURING 27 17.5 11 4.5 47 13.5 58 9.2 24 7.3 167 9.8
REAL ESTATE 1 0.6 0 0.0 6 1.7 34 5.4 39 11.9 80 4.7
RECREATION & PERSONAL 13 8.4 24 9.8 40 11.5 71 11.3 42 12.8 190 11.2
TRADING 14 9.1 9 3.7 24 6.9 37 5.9 65 19.8 149 8.8
TRANSPORT, UTILITIES & STORAGE 7 4.5 34 13.9 13 3.7 24 3.8 28 8.5 106 6.2
Total 154 100.0 244 100.0 347 100.0 628 100.0 329 100.0 1702 100.0
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
(a) Employment Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max p25 p50 p75
DHire Trained 1,580 0.054 0.227 0 1 0 0 0
DHire Experienced 1,569 0.055 0.229 0 1 0 0 0
DHire Permanent 1,603 0.093 0.290 0 1 0 0 0
DHire Casual 1,575 0.041 0.199 0 1 0 0 0
DHire Family 1,572 0.022 0.148 0 1 0 0 0
Hire Trained 1,580 0.258 1.954 0 54 0 0 0
Hire Experienced 1,569 0.231 1.410 0 25 0 0 0
Hire Permanent 1,603 0.437 2.548 0 54 0 0 0
Hire Casual 1,575 0.168 1.123 0 20 0 0 0
Hire Family 1,572 0.052 0.558 0 16 0 0 0
DPlanned Trained 1,601 0.094 0.292 0 1 0 0 0
DPlanned Experienced 1,592 0.109 0.312 0 1 0 0 0
Planned Train 275 1.284 1.866 0 20 0 1 2
Planned Exper 266 1.470 2.242 0 30 0 1 2
(b) Performance, Financial and Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max p25 p50 p75
DProfit 1,702 -0.0517 0.794 -1 1 -1 0 1
DSales 1,490 -0.0389 0.880 -1 1 -1 0 1
Applied for Loan 1,702 0.417 0.493 0 1 0 0 1
Applied and got a Loan 1,702 0.106 0.308 0 1 0 0 0
Applied and was rejected a Loan 1,702 0.311 0.463 0 1 0 0 1
Cannot Get Loan 1,702 0.633 0.482 0 1 0 1 1
Invested Capital 1,487 9.10e6 5.92e7 0 1.01e9 0 0 1.50e6
Business Age 1,677 10.090 7.673 1 70 5 8 12
New Innovative Product 1,702 0.259 0.438 0 1 0 0 1
Low Education 1,702 0.193 0.395 0 1 0 0 0
Medium Education 1,702 0.287 0.453 0 1 0 0 1
High Education 1,702 0.499 0.500 0 1 0 0 1
(c) Two-Sample t-Test for Equal Means
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Mean
VARIABLES N Applied and got a Loan Cannot Get Loan t-test
DProfit 1257 -0.05 -0.16 *
DSales 1121 -0.04 -0.15
Invested Capital 1118 9.6e6 1.3e7
Business Age 1236 10.00 10.64
New Innovative Product 1257 0.25 0.41 ***
Low Education 1257 0.21 0.21
Medium Education 1257 0.29 0.30
High Education 1257 0.48 0.48
Notes: The Hiring variables with the letter ”D” indicate that the variable is a dummy variable. The performance
variables DProfit and DSales take a value of 1 if performance increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 for a decrease.
DPlanned variables with a missing values have been converted to 0.
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Table 4: Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DHire Trained DHire Trained DHire Experienced DHire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.124** 0.149**
(0.060) (0.064)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.059*** 0.079***
(0.022) (0.023)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.103* 0.119**
(0.055) (0.059)
Sales Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.056*** 0.069***
(0.022) (0.023)
DProfit 0.002 -0.009
(0.008) (0.009)
DSales 0.003 -0.007
(0.009) (0.010)
Applied and got a Loan -0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026)
Cannot Get Loan 0.018 0.018 0.005 0.005
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.053*** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Low Education 0.007 -0.007 0.019 0.005
(0.037) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042)
Medium Education 0.017 0.011 0.013 0.005
(0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
High Education 0.040 0.039 0.051 0.050
(0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
R-squared 0.096 0.103 0.082 0.083
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 5.114 4.565 8.039 5.822
Prob > F-val 0.00613 0.0106 0.000338 0.00305
Notes: This table shows our baseline estimation results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm performance
and financial constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or experienced employees in the past 12 months. Variables
DSales and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there
was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. The Dummy CannotGetaLoan,
includes firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms who did not apply for a loan, but state in the
survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using an OLS regression. To control for
unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include sector and region fixed dummies in all our estimations. The
result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms
between performance and financial access are equal to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
20
Table 5: Intensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Hire Trained Hire Trained Hire Experienced Hire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 8.758* 7.565**
(5.048) (3.417)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan 5.243* 6.712**
(3.066) (2.620)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 8.445 7.067**
(5.248) (3.545)
Sales Increased* Cannot Get Loan 6.156* 6.796**
(3.185) (2.689)
DProfit 0.691 -1.055
(1.469) (1.269)
DSales 0.308 -1.310
(1.444) (1.253)
Applied and got a Loan -1.650 -2.010 0.257 0.063
(4.065) (4.222) (2.327) (2.436)
Cannot Get Loan 2.548 1.441 0.616 0.032
(2.401) (2.467) (1.665) (1.726)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.426** 0.434** 0.246*** 0.239***
(0.166) (0.171) (0.091) (0.092)
Business Age -0.063 -0.061 -0.073 -0.073
(0.092) (0.098) (0.069) (0.072)
New Innovative Product 7.633*** 7.636*** 4.421*** 4.466***
(2.458) (2.486) (1.460) (1.481)
Low Education -1.026 -3.954 2.353 0.813
(6.227) (6.513) (4.483) (4.509)
Medium Education 1.606 1.201 1.129 0.566
(5.967) (6.129) (4.356) (4.360)
High Education 4.295 4.195 4.421 4.104
(5.866) (5.981) (4.253) (4.231)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 2.031 2.104 3.743 3.415
Prob > F-val 0.132 0.122 0.0239 0.0332
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm performance and
financial constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent
variable is realized hiring variable measuring the amount of trained or experienced employees the firm hired in the past
12 months. Variables DSales and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no
change and -1 if there was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. The Dummy
CannotGetaLoan, includes firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms who did not apply for
a loan, but state in the survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using a Tobit
regression where we account for left censoring at zero. To control for unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects,
we include sector and region dummies in all our estimations. The result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom
of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms between performance and financial access are equal
to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Alternative Financial Access Measures, Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DHire Trained DHire Trained DHire Experienced DHire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.123** 0.149**
(0.060) (0.064)
Profit Increased* Applied and was Rejected a Loan 0.035 0.069**
(0.026) (0.029)
Profit Increased* Did not Apply but Needs Loan Service 0.086*** 0.091***
(0.033) (0.032)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.103* 0.119**
(0.055) (0.059)
Sales Increased* Applied and was Rejected a Loan 0.042 0.072**
(0.026) (0.028)
Sales Increased* Did not Apply but Needs Loan Service 0.075** 0.068**
(0.032) (0.032)
DProfit 0.002 -0.009
(0.008) (0.009)
DSales 0.003 -0.007
(0.009) (0.010)
Applied and got a Loan -0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026)
Applied and was rejected a Loan 0.016 0.011 0.006 -0.001
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Did not apply for Loan but Needs Loan Services 0.020 0.025* 0.004 0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.052*** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Low Education 0.006 -0.006 0.018 0.006
(0.038) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042)
Medium Education 0.017 0.011 0.013 0.005
(0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
High Education 0.041 0.041 0.051 0.051
(0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
R-squared 0.099 0.106 0.082 0.084
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 3.682 3.180 5.379 3.964
Prob > F-val 0.0117 0.0233 0.00111 0.00795
Test12 F-val 0.0659 0.0670 0.00636 0.00971
Test13 F-val 0.00571 0.0169 0.00174 0.0206
Test23 F-val 0.0206 0.0292 0.00219 0.00924
Notes: This table shows the alternative estimation results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm per-
formance and financial constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or experienced employees in the past 12
months. Variables DSales and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no
change and -1 if there was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. We estimate
columns 1 to 4 using an OLS regression. To control for unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include
sector and region dummies in all our estimations. The result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the
table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms between performance and financial access are equal to one
another. We also conduct Wald tests separately between two interactions for all possible combinations. ”Test12 Chi”
tests for the equality between the first and second interaction, ”Test 23 Chi” between the second and third interaction
and ”Test 13 Chi” between the first and third interaction. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Alternative Discouraged Firm Specification, Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DHire Trained DHire Trained DHire Experienced DHire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.117* 0.137**
(0.060) (0.064)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan2 0.055** 0.071***
(0.025) (0.026)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.095* 0.112*
(0.055) (0.059)
Sales Increased* Cannot Get Loan2 0.051** 0.072***
(0.025) (0.025)
DProfit 0.007 -0.002
(0.008) (0.010)
DSales 0.008 -0.003
(0.009) (0.010)
Applied and got a Loan -0.012 -0.012 -0.003 -0.003
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025)
Cannot Get Loan2 0.014 0.014 -0.003 -0.008
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.053*** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Low Education 0.011 -0.001 0.022 0.011
(0.037) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042)
Medium Education 0.022 0.017 0.016 0.010
(0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
High Education 0.043 0.043 0.054 0.054
(0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
R-squared 0.095 0.101 0.078 0.082
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 3.972 3.244 5.496 5.242
Prob > F-val 0.0191 0.0394 0.00419 0.00541
Notes: This table shows the alternative discouraged firm estimation results for the relationship between hiring skilled
labor, firm performance and financial constraints. Variable CannotGetaLoan2 includes firms who (i) applied for a loan,
but got rejected and (ii) firms who did not apply for a loan but admit needing loan application and other financial
services as well as would like to take out new debt in the next 12 months. The detailed variable definitions are provided
in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or
experienced employees in the past 12 months. Variables DSales and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance
variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance
of the firm a year ago. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using an OLS regression. To control for unobserved regional and
sector level fixed effects, we include sector and region dummies in all our estimations. The result for the Wald Tests are
reported in the bottom of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms between performance and
financial access are equal to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Table 12: Extensive Margin Effects: Accounting for Total Skilled Employees
(1) (2) (7) (8)
VARIABLES DHire Trained DHire Trained DHire Experienced DHire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.149** 0.168**
(0.064) (0.067)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.065*** 0.083***
(0.023) (0.024)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.128** 0.145**
(0.058) (0.062)
Sales Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.067*** 0.080***
(0.023) (0.024)
Total Trained Employees 0.010*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
Total Experienced Employees 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.003)
DProfit 0.004 -0.011
(0.008) (0.010)
DSales 0.001 -0.011
(0.009) (0.010)
Applied and got a Loan -0.008 -0.012 0.009 0.006
(0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.027)
Cannot Get Loan 0.019* 0.016 0.006 0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.047** 0.050**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Low Education 0.026 0.017 0.025 0.011
(0.037) (0.041) (0.038) (0.042)
Medium Education 0.041 0.038 0.022 0.015
(0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041)
High Education 0.049 0.053 0.051 0.051
(0.036) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041)
Observations 1,295 1,171 1,320 1,194
R-squared 0.144 0.153 0.110 0.114
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 6.125 6.056 8.527 7.376
Prob > F-val 0.00225 0.00242 0.000210 0.000656
Notes: Notes: This table shows the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm performance and financial constraints.
TrainedEmployees and ExperiencedEmployees measure the total amount of employees in the firm for each respective
employment category. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or experienced employees in the past 12 months. Variables
DSales and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there
was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. The Dummy CannotGetaLoan,
includes firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms who did not apply for a loan, but state in the
survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using an OLS regression. To control for
unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include sector and region fixed dummies in all our estimations. The
result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms
between performance and financial access are equal to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Probit Regression - Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DHire Trained DHire Trained DHire Experienced DHire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.910** 1.015**
(0.437) (0.398)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.454* 0.759***
(0.265) (0.273)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.861* 0.907**
(0.460) (0.413)
Sales Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.517* 0.730**
(0.272) (0.286)
DProfit 0.045 -0.140
(0.138) (0.144)
DSales 0.029 -0.137
(0.144) (0.145)
Applied and got a Loan -0.043 -0.057 0.011 0.002
(0.322) (0.338) (0.272) (0.292)
Cannot Get Loan 0.340 0.273 0.037 -0.013
(0.221) (0.221) (0.191) (0.205)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Business Age -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
New Innovative Product 0.603*** 0.613*** 0.443*** 0.452***
(0.150) (0.157) (0.145) (0.148)
Low Education -0.070 -0.350 0.257 0.076
(0.531) (0.564) (0.494) (0.508)
Medium Education 0.223 0.173 0.153 0.078
(0.510) (0.534) (0.483) (0.492)
High Education 0.437 0.427 0.571 0.536
(0.488) (0.506) (0.468) (0.474)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 5.179 4.839 9.619 7.602
Prob > Chi2 0.0750 0.0890 0.00815 0.0224
Notes: This table shows the results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm performance and financial
constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or experienced employees in the past 12 months. Variables DSales
and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there was a
decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. The Dummy CannotGetaLoan, includes
firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms who did not apply for a loan, but state in the
survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using a Probit regression. To control for
unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include sector and region fixed dummies in all our estimations. The
result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms
between performance and financial access are equal to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
29
Table 14: Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees and Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DHire Trained DHire Trained DHire Experienced DHire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.115** 0.134**
(0.058) (0.062)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.058*** 0.079***
(0.022) (0.022)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.098* 0.106*
(0.054) (0.059)
Sales Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.054** 0.066***
(0.021) (0.022)
DProfit 0.002 -0.009
(0.008) (0.009)
DSales 0.005 -0.004
(0.009) (0.010)
Applied and got a Loan -0.051 -0.060 -0.073 -0.089
(0.075) (0.080) (0.069) (0.073)
Cannot Get Loan 0.027 0.047 0.011 0.030
(0.067) (0.082) (0.065) (0.080)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.003* 0.003* 0.004* 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Business Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product 0.024 0.026 -0.016 -0.015
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
Low Education 0.020 0.021 0.027 0.027
(0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027)
Medium Education 0.019 0.023 0.013 0.014
(0.021) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020)
High Education 0.041* 0.048** 0.050** 0.056**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023)
ln(1+invested capital)* Applied and got a Loan -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(1+invested capital)* Cannot Get Loan 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Business Age* Applied and got a Loan -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Business Age* Cannot Get Loan -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product* Applied and got a Loan 0.078 0.086 0.093* 0.102*
(0.049) (0.053) (0.056) (0.060)
New Innovative Product* Cannot Get Loan 0.048 0.048 0.086** 0.086**
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038)
Low Education* Applied and got a Loan 0.054 0.058 0.072 0.084
(0.077) (0.084) (0.076) (0.082)
Low Education* Cannot Get Loan -0.033 -0.065 -0.033 -0.064
(0.068) (0.082) (0.069) (0.083)
Medium Education* Applied and got a Loan 0.037 0.032 0.059 0.063
(0.074) (0.082) (0.072) (0.079)
Medium Education * Cannot Get Loan -0.011 -0.036 -0.017 -0.041
(0.069) (0.084) (0.066) (0.081)
High Education * Applied and got a Loan 0.084 0.092 0.093 0.106
(0.078) (0.083) (0.074) (0.078)
High Education * Cannot Get Loan -0.021 -0.045 -0.024 -0.047
(0.069) (0.084) (0.068) (0.081)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
R-squared 0.101 0.109 0.088 0.091
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 4.931 4.345 7.742 5.360
Prob > F-val 0.00735 0.0132 0.000454 0.00481
Notes: This table shows the results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm performance and financial
constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or experienced employees in the past 12 months. Variables DSales
and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there was a
decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. The Dummy CannotGetaLoan, includes
firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms who did not apply for a loan, but state in the
survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using an OLS regression. To control for
unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include sector and region fixed dummies in all our estimations. The
result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms
between performance and financial access are equal to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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